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Apostoledes argued that the State would
be precluded from a retrial because to
do so would force the State to prove
conduct for which she was previously
tried. [d. at 1123. However, the court
of appeals stated, " [n]owhere in its
opinion did the Grady Court suggest
that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple trials when one
or more counts are left unresolved
following an initial trial due to jury
deadlock, the grant of a new trial, or
reversal on appeal." [d. at 1123. The
court asserted, rather, that the holding
in Grady applied to cases in which the
State failed to bring and join for trial
all charges arising from a single episode in a single proceeding. By initially bringing all criminal charges
against Ms. Apostoledes in a single
proceeding, the State conformed exactly to Grady's new double jeopardy
" same conduct" test, thereby avoiding the double jeopardy problems at
issue in Grady. [d.
Judge McAuliffe concurred in the
ruling with the exception of the
majority's interpretation of double
jeopardy in Grady. He opined that the
Supreme Court did not limit Grady to
successive prosecutions only, but may
have intended it to apply to multiple
punishments as well. Finding the
Blockberger "same offense" test a
rather sterile approach, McAuliffe
stated, "[t]he Grady modification
utilizes a case-oriented approach, adding flesh to the bare bones of each
essential element the conduct used to
prove that element, and then comparing the list of elements so defined."
[d. at 1124 (citing Blockberger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).
He concluded, though, that even if
Grady did apply to multiple punishments, the result in this case would not
have changed because conspiracy and
murder are not the same offense. 593
A.2d at 1126.
In its review of double jeopardy
challenges, the court ruled that former
jeopardy /acquittal, collateral estoppel,
and the recent Grady" same conduct"
test did not preclude the State from
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retrying the case for second degree
murder despite a prior conspiracy acquittal. This decision is significant as
it gives the State the opportunity for a
retrial in cases of acquittal or jury
deadlock and provides insight into
how Grady should be interpreted.
- Karl Phillips
Chisom v. Roemer: JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS COVERED WITIllN
MEANING OF "REPRESENTATIVES" IN VOTERS' RIGHTS
ACT.
The Supreme Court of the United
States settled a statutory interpretation
conflict among federal courts of appeals in deciding Chisom v. Roemer,
111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991). In Chisom,
the Supreme Court held that the use of
the term" representatives" in the Voters' Rights Act of 1965, as amended in
1982, covers judicial elections as well
as legislative elections. This holding
overturned the interpretation of Section 2 by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The petitioners in Chisom represented a class of approximately 135,000
African-American registered voters in
Orleans Parish, Louisiana. The petitioners brought their suit against various state elected officials challenging
the electoral process of judges to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana
consists of seven members. Two are
elected from one multi-member supreme court district. The remaining
five members are elected in singlemember supreme court districts. The
one multi-member district consists of
four parishes, one of which is the
Orleans Parish. In the Orleans Parish
more than one-half of the registered
voters are African-American, whereas
three-fourths of the registered voters
in the other three parishes are white.
The petitioners alleged that the
Louisiana method of electing judges
impermissibly diluted the voting
strength of African-Americans in violationofSection2 of the Voters Rights

Act of 1965 by broadening the populace of voters, thus frustrating efforts
by African-Americans to elect an African-American judge. [d. The United
States District Court for the District of
Louisiana dismissed the petitioners'
claim holding that judges are not" representatives," and thus judicial elections are not covered under Section 2
of the Voters' Rights Act. [d. at 2359.
On appeal, the court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case finding that the term "representatives"
within the Voters' Rights Act included
anyone elected by a popular election
from a field of candidates. The court
thus held that judges were included
within the meaning of " representatives." [d. On remand the district
court concluded that insufficient evidence existed to establish a violation
of Section 2 of the Voters' Rights Act
and the petitioners appealed once again
to the court of appeals. [d. at 2360.
Following the en banc decision in a
similar case, the court of appeals remanded Chisom, and the petitioners
appealed. [d. at 2361.
While the petitioners' appeal was
pending, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit decided League o/United
Latin-American Citizens Council v.
Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (1990) (hereinafter "LULAC"), a case similar to
Chisom involving the interpretation
of "representative" within Section 2
of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965.
Chisom, 111 S. Ct. 2360. TheLULAC
court reasoned that, because public
opinion is irrelevant in the role of the
judiciary, judges do not serve in a
representative capacity and are not
included within the meaning of " representative" in interpreting Section 2
of the Voters' Rights Act. [d.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari arid consolidated LULA C and
Chisom for determining the test to be
applied in deciding whether a violation of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965
exists in judicial and other elections.
[d. at 2362.
The Court began its analysis by
setting out the text of Section 2 of the

Voters' Rights Act of 1965 as amended
in 1982. The Act in part states that,
[a] violation ... is established
if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that
the political processes leading
to nomination or election in
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a
class of citizens ... in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in
the political process and to
elect 'representatives' of their
choice.
Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2364 (quoting
Voters' Rights Act of 1965, §2(b), as
amended, 42 U .S.C.A. 1973).
The Court then reviewed LULA C
and rejected the respondent's claim
that Congress' use of the word" representatives" in Section 2(b) of the Voters' Rights Act was evidence of congressional intent to exclude judicial
elections from coverage. [d. at 2364.
The Court noted the LULAC court's
distinction of Section 2(b) providing
two separate protections of minority
voting rights. [d.
The Court reasoned that the LULA C
majority created two tests. One test
was to be applied when the right of
individuals to participate in the political process was frustrated, such as by
time and location disincentives that
result in depriving a class of people of
the opportunity to vote. [d. at 2365.
The second part of the LULAC Section 2(b) test involved the denial of the
voters' "opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. " [d. at 2364
(quoting LULAC, 914 F.2d at 625.)
In rejecting the dual reading of
Section 2(b), the Court reasoned that
to substitute the word "or" for the
word " and" in interpreting Section 2
would destroy the plain meaning of
the sentence. [d. at 2365. The Court
determined that such a radical reconstruction would be necessary to separate the opportunity to participate in
the political process from the opportu-

nity to elect representatives. [d.
Chisom is also important as it repreThe Court referred to its analysis sents the Court's continuation of the
in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 liberal application of the test for find(1973) and Whitcombv. Chavis, 403 ing a violation of the Voters' Rights
U.S. 124 (1971) in identifying the Act of 1965.
language from which Section 2 is
patterned. Chisom, 110 S. Ct. at
- Daryl D. Jones
2365. In both of these cases, the Court
found the opportunity to participate in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine:
the political process inextricably con- ABSENT MATERIAL CHANGE IN
nected to the opportunity to elect rep- STATEMENT'S MEANING, DELIBERATE ALTERATION OF
resentatives. [d.
The Court opined that further sup- SPEAKER'S WORDS BY AUTHOR
port for their interpretation of "repre- NOT ACTUAL MALICE.
In Masson v. New Yorker Magasentatives" as including judicial elections was evidenced by Congress' zine, 111 S.Ct. 2419 (1991), the United
replacing the word " legislators" with States Supreme Court held that an
" representatives" when adopting the author's alteration of a speaker's statelanguage of the Court in White v. ments did not amount to actual malice
Regester. Chisom, 110S. Ct. at 2366. for defamation purposes unless such
The Court reasoned that the substitu- an alteration resulted in a material
tion of" representatives" for" legisla- change in the statement's meaning.
tors" indicates that Congress intended Thus, the Court rejected the argument
the phrase to cover more than legisla- that any alteration of a speaker's words
tive elections. [d.
beyond those made for grammar or
The Court next likened the inclu- syntax proved knowledge offalsity or
sion of sheriffs, prosecutors, state reckless disregard for the truth.
treasurers, and other elected officials
Plaintiff, Jeffrey Masson, claimed
chosen by popular elections as "repre- he was defamed by article author Janet
sentatives" to judges who are chosen Malcolm when she used quotation
by popular elections. [d. The Court marks to attribute to Masson comdetermined that the word" representa- ments he alleged he did not make.
tive" refers to someone who prevails Malcolm interviewed Masson, a noted
in a popular election, within which psychoanalyst and former Projects
Director of the Sigmund Freud Arjudicial elections exist. [d.
Lastly, the Court found their in- chives, for an article she was writing
terpretation of Section 2 consistent about him for The New Yorker magawith the broad remedial purpose of zine. Prior to the publication of the
ridding the country of racial discrimi- article, Masson expressed concern to
nation in voting, upon which the Vot- the fact-checking department of the
ers' Rights Act of 1965 was enacted. magazine about a number of errors in
[d. at 2368. In applying the Voters' several passages. Despite these conRights Act, the Court noted its policy cerns, the article appeared in the magastatement in Allen v. State Board of zine as a two-part series in 1983, and
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), pro- in 1984 Respondent, AlfredA. Knopf,
viding that the Act should be broadly Inc., published the entire series as a
read to combat discrimination. book.
Masson brought a libel action
Chisom, 110 S. Ct. at 2368.
The decision in Chisom is signifi- against Malcolm, New Yorker Magacant as it disallows race based voter zine, and Alfred Knopf, Inc. under
dilution or "gerrymandering" of elec- California libel law in the United
toral districts in judicial elections States District Court for the Northern
through narrowly interpreting Section District of California. The parties
2 of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965. agreed that Masson was a public fig22.2IThe Law Forum - 31

